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LIVING ORGAN PROCUREMENT FROM THE MENTALLY INCOMPETENT:
THE NEED FOR MORE APPROPRIATE GUIDELINES







With the case of Belgium as a negative example, this paper will evaluate
the legitimacy of using mentally incompetents as organ sources. The first
section examines the underlying moral dilemma that results from the neces-
sity of balancing the principle of respect for persons with the obligation to
help people in desperate need. We argue for the rejection of a radical
utilitarian approach but also question the appropriateness of a categorical
prohibition. Section two aims to strike a fair balance between the com-
peting interests at stake and to define the conditions under which organ
harvest from mentally incompetents might be morally acceptable. To this
end, we morally assess the main requirements that have been put forward
to allow organ removal from incompetent donors. We conclude that the
current Belgian legislation is far too permissive and that national regulations
that do not permit the harvest of non-regenerable organs from mentally
incompetents in exceptional circumstances are too restrictive. On the basis
of this discussion, we propose a number of guiding principles for decision-
making in this area.
INTRODUCTION
Confronted with a growing demand for organ transplants
and an inadequate supply of cadaveric organs, transplant
centres and desperate patients have increasingly looked
to living donors.1 In a further effort to address organ
scarcity, various strategies to enlarge the pool of living
donors are being examined. For instance, some commen-
tators argue that in order to attract more donors the
principle of non-commercialization should be relaxed in
favour of a system of financial incentives.2 Additionally,
transplantation teams have been adopting new allocation
models that allow willing but incompatible donors to
donate to their intended recipient indirectly through an
exchange program.3 Furthermore, criteria for acceptance
of organs have been extended to include donors that were
previously deemed to be unsuitable.4 Continuing liberal-
ization of living donor criteria may even result in the
mentally incompetent being considered as an additional
and easy source of organs. However, since the mentally
incompetent are incapable of giving free and informed
1 As a result, in some countries the quantity of living donor organs even
exceeds the number of deceased donor organs. See L.D. Horvat, S.Z.
Shariff & A.X. Garg. Global Trends in the Rates of Living Kidney
Donation. Kidney Int 2009; 75: 1088–1098.
2 C.A. Erin & J. Harris. An Ethical Market in Human Organs. J Med
Ethics 2003; 29: 137–138; J. Radcliffe-Richards et al. The Case for
Allowing Kidney Sales. Lancet 1998; 351: 1950–1952; S. Satel, ed. 2008.
When Altruism Isn’t Enough: The Case for Compensating Kidney
Donors. Washington, DC: AEI Press; J.S. Taylor. 2005. Stakes And
Kidneys: Why Markets In Human Body Parts Are Morally Imperative.
Aldershot: Ashgate.
3 F.L. Delmonico et al. Donor Kidney Exchanges. Am J Transplant
2004; 4: 1628–1634; J.I. Roodnat et al. Successful Expansion of the
Living Donor Pool by Alternative Living Donation Programs. Am J
Transplant 2009; 9: 2150–2156.
4 A. Kumar et al. Expanding the Living Related Donor Pool in Renal
Transplantation: Use of Marginal Donors. J Urol 2000; 163: 33–36;
A. López-Navidad & F. Caballero. Extended Criteria for Organ
Acceptance: Strategies for Achieving Organ Safety and for Increas-
ing Organ Pool. Clin Transplant 2003; 17: 308–324; A.J. Matas. Trans-
plantation Using Marginal Living Donors. Am J Kidney Dis 2006; 47:
353–355.
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consent, their use as living donors5 is bound to raise
serious ethical issues.
This problem may be especially pressing in countries
whose transplantation regulations are very lenient with
regard to the use of mentally incompetents as organ
donors. In this respect, Belgian legislation is clearly
extremely permissive when compared to other Western
countries. Since the amendment of the organ transplan-
tation law on 25 February 2007,6 organ removal from
mentally incompetents is explicitly allowed, even for
organs that cannot regenerate. Moreover, the conditions
that have to be met are disconcertingly lax and leave the
door wide open for exploitation. Indeed, organ procure-
ment from mentally incompetents is permitted if the
recipient’s life is in imminent danger, if the transplanta-
tion of organs from a deceased person would not produce
an equally satisfactory result, and if the legal or person-
ally appointed representative has given consent.
On 12 February 2010 Laurette Onkelinx, Federal
Minister for Social Affairs and Public Health, decided to
consult the Belgian Advisory Committee on Bioethics
regarding, inter alia, the 2007 amendments to the organ
transplantation law pertaining to organ procurement
from mentally incompetents. The Minister wondered
whether those amendments did not violate the dignity of
the persons concerned.7 This was the first time the Com-
mittee was asked to issue an opinion on an existing
(rather than a draft) legislation. On 9May 2011 the Com-
mittee issued its Opinion,8 which expressed a unanimous
agreement that the provisions on organ procurement
from mentally incompetents in the current Belgian law
are ethically unacceptable.9 The Committee made recom-
mendations for revision.10
With the case of Belgium as a negative example, this
paper will evaluate the legitimacy of using mentally
incompetents as organ sources. The first section examines
the underlying moral dilemma that results from the
necessity of balancing the principle of respect for persons
with the obligation to help people in desperate need. We
argue for the rejection of a radical utilitarian approach
but also question the appropriateness of a categorical
prohibition. Section two aims to strike a fair balance
between the competing interests at stake and to define the
conditions under which organ harvest from mentally
incompetents may be morally acceptable. To this end, we
morally assess the main requirements that have been
put forward to allow organ removal from incompetent
donors. We conclude that the current Belgian legislation
is far too permissive and that national regulations that do
not permit the harvest of non-regenerable organs from
mentally incompetents in exceptional circumstances are
too restrictive. On the basis of this discussion, we propose
a number of guiding principles for decision-making in
this area.
SHOULD ORGAN HARVEST FROM
MENTALLY INCOMPETENTS EVER
BE ALLOWED?
Why organ harvest from the mentally
incompetent is morally problematic
The practice of living organ donation by competent
adults is based on a very delicate balance between the
principle of respect for persons and the obligation to help
people in desperate need. Organ retrieval invariably risks
significant harm to the donor. However, allowing it may
be very beneficial to the intended recipients, because it
could greatly alleviate their medical condition or even be
life-saving.Moreover, by decreasing health care costs and
shortening organ transfer waiting lists, living organ dona-
tion may also be commendable from the standpoint
of justice. In view of these conflicting pressures, the
decisive factor in determining whether donation should
be permitted is the potential donor’s autonomous deci-
sion. In short, organ procurement is only warranted if the
prospective donor voluntarily decides that the risks are
acceptable. The autonomy of the donor is only limited by
the constraints of reasonable medical practice. Living
donation will not be allowed if the transplant team is of
the opinion that the benefits to the recipient do not out-
weigh the risks to the donor or if it considers the absolute
level of risk to the donor to be too high.
Where the prospective donor is mentally incompetent,
this balance is severely affected. Clearly, an enormous
benefit to the recipient would still be the fundamental
reason why organ retrieval is being considered. However,
the potential harm of surgical intervention cannot be
justified on the basis of an autonomous decision by the
person who will be subjected to it, as individuals suffering
from severe mental impairment are incapable of giving
5 Because a mentally incompetent person cannot give proper consent,
she is not to be considered as an organ donor in the strict sense of the
term, but rather as an organ source.
6 Wet betreffende het wegnemen en transplanteren van organen/
Loi sur le prélèvement et la transplantation d’organes. Available at
http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_lg.pl?language=nl&la=
N&cn=1986061337&table_name=wet (Dutch) and http://www.ejustice.
just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_lg.pl?language=fr&la=F&cn=
1986061337&table_name=loi (French) [Accessed 19 Feb 2012].
7 Letter from the Minister to the Committee, 22 March 2010.
8 Belgian Advisory Committee on Bioethics, Opinion No. 50, 9 May
2011. Available at: http://www.health.belgium.be/eportal/Healthcare/
Consultativebodies/Commitees/Bioethics/Opinions/index.htm (in
Dutch and French) [Accessed 19 Feb 2012].
9 See p. 109 of the Opinion (Dutch version) or p. 104 (French version).
10 The Belgian government is currently preparing a bill to bring the
organ transplantation law in line with EU Directive 2010/45/EU. This
opportunity may be taken to modify the provisions regarding organ
procurement from mentally incompetents.
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free and informed consent. Consequently, all medical
decisions have to be taken by a legal guardian, who must
ensure that the personal interests of her ward are
respected. In view of this constraint, it is hard to see how
organ retrieval from a mentally incompetent person
could ever be appropriate, given the lack of any thera-
peutic benefit for the organ source herself. Indeed, con-
cerns for the personal integrity and dignity of mentally
incompetents strongly militate against allowing an intru-
sive medical procedure when the person benefiting from it
is someone else.
Bearing these considerations in mind, it has been right-
fully stressed that a radical utilitarian justification of
organ retrieval from mentally incompetents would invite
unchecked abuse.11 For one, mentally incompetents
would be burdened with a so-called ‘duty to donate’ that
is not imposed upon the rest of society.12 Although
unequal treatment may be allowed if it is justified by
objective criteria and a legitimate aim, the vulnerable
position of mentally incompetents should demand
increased rather than decreased protection. More im-
portantly, if a radical utilitarian approach were to be
adopted, mentally incompetents risk being sacrificed on
the altar of morally problematic cost-benefit calculations.
Balanced against the health care profit for society and the
medical benefit for the competent recipient, compelled
organ ‘donation’ by mentally incompetents may all too
often appear the right thing to do. Using maximization of
societal prosperity as the yardstick, the mentally incom-
petent potential donor will very often draw the shortest
straw when pitted against a competent recipient or a
competent alternative donor.
Why a total ban may nevertheless also
be problematic
Recognizing that organ retrieval from mentally incompe-
tents poses severe moral problems, some commentators
have advocated a total ban on such organ harvests.13
Although it would clearly prevent abuse of mentally
incompetents, a categorical prohibition could also be
morally problematic. A duty to fully protect vulnerable
people may conflict with a duty to help people in need.14
When the foreseeable risks to a donor are comparatively
low and the potential benefits to the recipient are huge,
transplantation may be morally desirable. However, as
will be argued below, in such (presumably very rare)
cases, several threshold requirements would have to
be satisfied, in order to compensate for the reduced
autonomy on the part of the donor. Furthermore, a total
ban on organ harvests from mentally incompetents
might be contrary to their own interests since it may be
the case, in very specific circumstances, that the benefits
they would receive from providing an organ could rea-
sonably be expected to significantly outweigh the risks,
exceptionally even if it concerns a kidney. We will come
back to this in the following section. Finally, it could be
objected that a total refusal to involve mentally incom-
petents might not be congruent with the obligation to
treat vulnerable individuals fairly. In the event of moder-
ate mental disability or only diminished autonomy,
uniformly disregarding a genuine willingness to donate,
thus condemning mentally incompetents to being in a
uniquely receiving posture, might be morally problematic
as well, just as is the case when they are considered to be
the preferred organ donors.
AN ETHICAL EVALUATION OF
EXISTING CRITERIA
Looking at examples of regulations allowing organ
procurement from mentally incompetents, one notices
that various substantive and procedural conditions may
apply.15 As to substantive requirements, we can distin-
guish between five categories.
The medical condition of the recipient
The first of these focuses on the medical condition of the
recipient, stipulating that organ removal from a mentally
incompetent individual is only allowed for the direct
11 B.A. Schenberg. Harvesting Organs from Minors and Incompetent
Adults to Supply the Nation’s Organ Drought. Ind Health L Rev 2007;
3: 319–359: 347.
12 It is an established principle that a competent adult has every right to
decline organ donation, even if she is the only person who can save the
intended recipient. This fundamental principle has been forcefully
articulated in the infamous McFall v. Shimp case of 1978. Petitioned by
a terminally ill man to require a potential life-saving bone marrow
donation by his first cousin, the Pennsylvania District Court ruled that,
although it found the refusal of the defendant to be morally indefen-
sible, a competent adult is under no legal obligation to submit to an
intrusion of his body for the benefit of a third party. In rejecting the
motion of the plaintiff, the court emphasized that for a society founded
upon respect for the individual and an absolute right to bodily security,
ordering forcible extraction of living body tissue for the sake of
someone else would be revolting. See McFall v. Shimp (1978) 10 Pa. D.
& C. 3d 90.
13 See, for instance, C. Cheyette. Organ Harvests from the Legally
Incompetent: An Argument against Compelled Altruism. Boston Coll
Law Rev 2000; 41: 465–515.
14 This dilemma has been eloquently formulated in a dissenting opinion
by Justice Steinfeld in Strunk v. Strunk: ‘My sympathies and emotions
are torn between compassion to aid an ailing young man and a duty to
fully protect unfortunate members of society.’ See Strunk v. Strunk
(1969) 445 S.W. 2d 145 (Ky Ct of App) at 149.
15 We focus on Belgium, Ireland, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the
United States, where procurement of a non-regenerable organ from
mentally incompetents is (or can be) allowed in certain cases.
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therapeutic benefit of the recipient. Usually, it is explicitly
mentioned that the intended recipient’s life has to be in
imminent danger. From a moral point of view, it can be
rightfully argued that only an enormous benefit for the
intended recipient could justify intruding upon the physi-
cal integrity of a person incapable of consent. However,
it is not always obvious what really constitutes mortal
danger, especially in cases of end-stage renal disease. For
instance, in In re Guardianship of Pescinski, the allegedly
terminally ill kidney patient Elaine Pescinski continued to
live for nearly two more years after being denied a kidney
transplant from her mentally incompetent brother.16
Moreover, as in Little v. Little, some courts have permit-
ted kidney transplantation if the recipient, although in no
mortal danger, would otherwise be condemned to time-
consuming dialysis treatment, presumably for the rest of
her life.17 As we will argue below, this kind of extension to
non-life-threatening conditions is morally unacceptable.
The last resort requirement
The next substantive requirement dictates that a mentally
incompetent individual may only serve as an organ
source of last resort. First, it must be ascertained that no
alternative medical treatment exists or is expected to be
available in the near future. Whereas some diseases, for
which a bone marrow transplant offers a potential cure,
may quickly escalate to the point that transplantation
offers the only chance for survival, only in very few cases
of renal disease is sustained renal dialysis not a viable
long-term alternative. Using mentally incompetents as
kidney donors merely to increase the comfort and quality
of life of a recipient would seem difficult to justify.
Indeed, only the prevention of inevitable death may
warrant a rare exception to the fundamental rule that
individuals with diminished or no autonomy should
be excluded from intrusive medical procedures for the
benefit of a third party. Moreover, organ removal from
mentally incompetents is absolutely prohibited if a suit-
able organ from a cadaveric donor is available or is likely
to become available. Although this condition seems to be
universally accepted, few commentators seem to heed the
implicit call to promote post-mortem donation. However,
increasing reliance on living organ donors is problematic
if insufficient effort is expended to maximize the supply of
cadaveric organs. It would be all the more morally revolt-
ing to call upon mentally incompetent donors to alleviate
the organ shortage if this was in no small way caused by
a hopelessly inefficient regulation of post-mortem dona-
tion in the country at issue.
Further, it is sometimes mentioned that organ harvest-
ing from mentally incompetents is only allowed if no
compatible competent living donor is available. All rea-
sonable steps have to be taken to find a donor who under-
stands the risks and benefits of donation and has the
autonomy to consent freely. It follows that no compat-
ibility testing on mentally incompetent individuals should
be performed until other potential living donors with the
capacity to consent have been examined and found to be
histoincompatible. This condition clearly aims at pre-
venting the sacrifice of the integrity of vulnerable indi-
viduals where compatible competent donors are hesitant
or unwilling to donate. Families might prefer to use
a mentally incompetent individual as an organ donor
instead of a family member who is more valued or con-
sidered to be more promising. That this worry is of more
than theoretical import becomes painfully clear in cases
on record where a competent potential donor has not
even been solicited.18 Furthermore, we should bear in
mind that competent potential donors who are unwilling
to donate may have themselves declared unfit without
much difficulty, thereby de facto turning the mentally
incompetent individual into the donor of last resort. To
prevent this from happening, claims that no compatible
competent donor is available need to be subjected to close
scrutiny.
The expected health impact of the
transplantation on recipient and source
The third cluster of substantive requirements pertains to
the foreseeable physical impact of the transplantation on
both recipient and donor. Organ removal from mentally
incompetents should only be considered if it is very likely
that the intended recipient will benefit from the transplant.
Consequently, the donation must have the potential to
save the life of the recipient, and there has to be a rea-
sonable chance that the medical procedure is successful
and the organ will not be rejected. If the expected
outcome of the transplantation is below a minimum
threshold of anticipated success, mentally incompetent
individuals should not be volunteered to serve as organ
source, because the reasonably predictable benefits will
not outweigh the risks the donor will face. After all, in
case of organ rejection, the recipient would not have
gained anything, whereas the donor would have been
16 In re Guardianship of Pescinski (1975) 226 N.W. 2d 180 (Wis Sup Ct).
The case was decided by the court on 4 March 1975. Elaine Pescinski
died on 5 January 1977. As mentioned in the fourth footnote to the
dissenting opinion of Justice Day in In Matter of Guardianship of
Eberhardy (1981) 102 Wis. 2d 539.
17 Little v. Little (1979) 576 S.W. 2d 493 (Tex Ct of App) at 499.
18 An egregious example involved parents petitioning for compatibility
testing of their thirteen-year-old mentally incompetent boy without
even considering his eleven-year-old mentally sound sister as an alter-
native. See M.D. Levine et al. The Medical Ethics of Bone Marrow
Transplantation in Childhood. J Pediatr 1975; 86: 145–150: 147.
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subjected to the discomfort and physical risks of the
intervention and might even experience intense psy-
chological distress. Although competent donors are in a
position to accept a lower benefit-to-risk ratio, exposing
incompetent people to a medical intervention with a
negative risk-benefit balance is highly problematical. In
addition, organ harvest from mentally incompetents
may only be allowed if the physical risks to the donor
are deemed to be reasonable. The rationale behind this
requirement is that the benefits to the donor cannot pos-
sibly be expected to outweigh major health hazards.
Although competent donors may, after careful delibera-
tion, consider participating in a transplant procedure
that is not in their best interest, no such intervention is
allowed if the prospective donor does not have the mental
ability to assess and accept this balance.
In considering what kind of medical complications a
mentally incompetent donor may encounter, several
types of risks should be taken into account, starting with
the risk of mortality due to the surgery itself. In this
respect, the collection of bone marrow is a relatively safe
procedure.19 However, since bone marrow procurement
from mentally incompetents would be likely to be per-
formed under general anesthesia, fatal complications
cannot be ruled out. Estimated at 0.031%, the risk of
mortality from kidney removal is considerably higher.20
In comparison, with an incidence between 0.2% and 2%,
the calculated risk of mortality from partial liver dona-
tion is already very significant.21 Apart from this, the
donor may be exposed to significant morbidity resulting
from the operation. Severe peri- or postoperative compli-
cations associated with bone marrow donation are very
rare.22 In the case of kidney or partial liver donation,
serious and life-threatening side-effects are more fre-
quent, but their incidence is difficult to estimate. Accord-
ing to some reports, the complication rate of donor
nephrectomy is as high as 35% with up to 7% major
injuries.23 Although a consensus exists that the morbidity
rate of partial liver donation is significantly higher, the
reported data show an immense variation.24 Finally,
organ donation may also lead to long-term health prob-
lems. Because living organ donation is a fairly recent
medical procedure and follow-up studies cover only a
very limited period, considerable uncertainty about
the nature and prevalence of long-term risks remains.
Although reports suggest that kidney and liver donors
have the same life expectancy as the rest of the population
and do not have a heightened risk of chronic renal or liver
disease later in life, more time is needed to make conclu-
sive assessments.25 In case of donation of solid organs,
long-term risks should certainly not be disregarded in
advance.26 As a matter of fact, dozens of kidney donors
reportedly have been placed on the waiting list for kidney
transplantation after they themselves suffered renal fail-
ure.27 Moreover, renal failure would be even more prob-
lematic for a mentally incompetent person, because she
will likely not be given priority on the waiting list and she
will find it very difficult to comprehend and comply with
regular dialysis treatment.
19 By 2004, eleven deaths associated with bone marrow procurement
had been reported worldwide, although for most of these no clear causal
relation was established. See D.L. Confer. 2004. Hematopoietic Cell
Donors. In Thomas’ Hematopoietic Cell Transplantation. K.G. Blume,
S.J. Forman & F.R. Appelbaum, eds. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publish-
ing: 538–549: 543.
20 D.L. Segev et al. Perioperative Mortality and Long-term Survival
Following Live Kidney Donation. JAMA 2010; 303: 959–966. These
figures are based on a follow-up study relating to the period 1994–2009.
This study also showed that the mortality remained unchanged during
those fifteen years.
21 Merion reports a mortality risk of 0.2% to 0.5%. See R. Merion.
Current Status and Future of Liver Transplantation. Semin Liver Dis
2010; 30: 411–421: 417. A recent review article reports a mortality risk
of 0.2% to 2%. See Y. Yuan & G. Mitsukazu. Biliary Complications in
Living Liver Donors. Surg Today 2010; 40: 411–417.
22 The incidence of serious and life-threatening side-effects is estimated
at 0.27% to 1.34%. Most of these were nerve, bone or tissue injuries
sustained during the collection procedure. See Confer, op. cit. note 19;
J. Halter et al. Severe Events in Donors after Allogeneic Hematopoietic
Stem Cell Donation. Haematologica 2009: 94–101: 94; B.A.H.Williams,
K.L. Grady & D.M. Sandiford-Guttenbiel. 1991. Organ Transplanta-
tion. London: Churchill Livingstone: 211. Since bone marrow regener-
ates within 4 to 6 weeks, no irreversible long-term damage is to be
expected. Ibid.
23 See J.D. Kallich & J.F. Merz. The Transplant Imperative: Protecting
Living Donors from the Pressure to Donate. J Corp Law 1995; 20:
139–154: 148; G. Mjøen et al. Morbidity and Mortality in 1022 Con-
secutive Living Donor Nephrectomies: Benefits of a Living Donor
Registry. Transplantation 2009; 88: 1273–1279: 1278; A. Spital. 2001.
Ethical Issues in Living Related Donors. In The Ethics of Organ Trans-
plantation. W. Shelton & J. Balint, eds. Oxford: Elsevier Science: 103.
These complications include major postoperative bleeding, damage to
the spleen or adrenal glands, pulmonary embolisms, and retroperitoneal
infections.
24 Yuan and Mitsukazu report a morbidity rate of 0 to 78.3%, depend-
ing on the criteria that are used. See Yuan &Mitsukazu, op. cit. note 21.
A report of French experts indicates that the number of partial liver
transplantations is in decline because of high morbidity rates: ‘Après
une période initiale d’enthousiasme, le nombre de procédures faites,
tant en Europe qu’aux Etats-Unis, est en déclin depuis quelques années
sous l’influence de la fréquence des complications graves survenant
chez les donneurs. [. . .] Depuis 2006, ce type de transplantation est en
déclin en France avec une baisse de 80 % enregistrée entre 2005 et 2006.’
See Agence de la Biomédicine. 2009. Recommandations formalisées
d’experts sur le prélèvement et la greffe à partir de donneur vivant. Paris:
Médi-Text: 62.
25 See D.A. Goldfarb et al. Renal Outcome 25 Years after Donor
Nephrectomy. J Urol 2001; 166: 2043–2047; J.S. Najarian et al. 20
Years or More of Follow-Up of Living Kidney Donors. Lancet 1992;
340(8823): 807–810; Segev, op. cit. note 20.
26 For instance, there is a possibility that a kidney donor will need a
kidney transplant if, due to an accident or disease, her remaining kidney
is damaged.
27 See M.D. Ellison et al. Living Kidney Donors in Need of Kidney
Transplants: A Report from the Organ Procurement and Transplanta-
tion Network. Transplantation 2002; 74: 1349–1351.
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The exact level of risk that a mentally incompetent
person may be exposed to is a topic of debate and con-
troversy. Whereas most European regulations stipulate
that organ removal should not be carried out if there is
a serious risk to the health of the donor, American court
decisions seem to be slightly more strict, holding that
only minimal health risk is acceptable. In reality,
however, due to the broad interpretation of what con-
stitutes minimal risk, American courts are generally
much more permissive than the transplant legislations
of European countries. Apart from Belgium, Ireland,28
Sweden,29 and the United Kingdom,30 removal of a non-
regenerable organ from mentally incompetents is pro-
hibited in Europe. By contrast, American courts have on
several occasions authorized kidney harvesting from a
mentally incompetent individual. To be frank, it might
be argued that these courts have minimized the risks
associated with kidney donation and exaggerated the
expected benefits to the donor, in order to justify the
use of mentally incompetents as kidney sources. For
instance, in both Strunk v. Strunk and Little v. Little,
kidney donation by a mentally incompetent person was
authorized, partly because the court deemed the medical
risks to be only minimal.31 However, if we take into
account the risk of mortality, severe complications, and
potential long-term effects, kidney donation cannot pos-
sibly fit the conditions of minimal risk. Nevertheless,
even if kidney removal involves more than minimal risk,
the use of mentally incompetents could be morally
acceptable if it can be convincingly established that they
would receive significant psychological benefits from the
transplantation.
The possibility of psychological benefits
As noted earlier, the legislations of various countries
stipulate that a medical intervention involving mentally
incompetents may only be performed if it would be to
their direct benefit or in their best interest. However, in
case of an intervention that would not have any thera-
peutic benefit for the incompetent person, such as organ
donation, surrogate decision-makers need to focus on
possible psychological benefits.
Studies of adult and adolescent donors have revealed
several types of important psychological benefits.32 First
of all, donation may assure a continuing close relation-
ship with the recipient and the avoidance of the intense
emotional distress that the donor may experience in the
event of the intended recipient’s death. Secondly, psycho-
logical benefit might flow from the altruistic act itself.
However, in enumerating the psychological benefits that
have been reported by competent adult and adolescent
donors, this argumentation conveniently overlooks the
fact that many donors have expressed severe negative
emotions, such as feelings of abuse, lower self-esteem, a
sense of neglect and lack of appreciation, a strained rela-
tionship with the recipient and, where the transplant was
not successful, feelings of anger, guilt, and blame.33
More importantly, the extent to which mentally incom-
petent persons can experience psychological benefits
remains unclear. Because of their insufficiently developed
cognitive and emotional capacities, most mentally incom-
petents can hardly be expected to identify the altruistic
aspect of donation, although the contrary has routinely
been suggested by American courts when authorizing
kidney removal from mentally incompetents. For
instance, in Little v. Little, the court allowed kidney
removal, asserting that the mentally incompetent donor
would likely receive considerable psychological and emo-
tional benefits, such as ‘heightened self-esteem, enhanced
status in the family, renewed meaning in life, and other
positive feelings including transcendental or peak experi-
ences.’34 However, it might be safely assumed that men-
tally incompetents will not accrue the same psychological
benefits that may result from a mentally competent
understanding of the transplant procedure.35 In addition,
28 In the absence of any specific legislation with respect to transplanta-
tion, living donation in Ireland is governed by ethical guidelines drafted
for the Irish living donation programme based in the Beaumont Hos-
pital in Dublin. These guidelines allow the removal of a non-regenerable
organ from mentally incompetents under very strict conditions. Simi-
larly, the Human Tissue Bill that is currently being drafted, also
provides for the removal of a non-regenerable organ from mentally
incompetents. The draft Proposal for the General Scheme of the
Human Tissue Bill is available at http://www.dohc.ie/consultations/
closed/human_tissue_bill/draft_proposals.pdf?direct=1 [Accessed 19
Feb 2012]. We would like to thank Dr. Siobhán O’Sullivan for
providing this information.
29 Lag (1995:831) om transplantation m.m., 8 §, available at http://
www.notisum.se/rnp/sls/lag/19950831.htm [Accessed 19 Feb 2012].
30 In the United Kingdom, under the Mental Capacity Act 2005, a
court can authorize organ procurement from a mentally incompe-
tent person on the grounds that this would be in her best interests.
Although, as yet, no cases have arisen involving non-regenerable
organs, nothing would prevent such cases to emerge. See J. Herring.
2010. Medical Law and Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 423–
424; S.D. Pattinson. 2009. Medical Law and Ethics. London: Sweet &
Maxwell: 477–478.
31 Strunk v. Strunk (1969) 445 S.W. 2d 145 (Ky Ct of App) at 148–149;
Little v. Little (1979) 576 S.W. 2d 493 (Tex Ct of App) at 499.
32 K.D. MacLeod et al. Pediatric Sibling Donors of Successful and
Unsuccessful Hematopoietic Stem Cell Transplants (HSCT): A Quali-
tative Study of Their Psychosocial Experience. J Pediatr Psychol 2003;
28: 223–231; A.F. Patenaude. Psychological Impact of Bone Marrow
Transplantation: Current Perspectives. Yale J Biol Med 1990; 63:
515–519.
33 See Cheyette, op. cit. note 13, pp. 475–485 & 500–508; P. Cohen.
Donor’s Dread: Why Do Children Who Help a Sick Sibling End Up
Depressed? New Scientist 1997; 55: 20.
34 Little v. Little (1979) 576 S.W. 2d 493 (Tex Ct of App) at 499.
35 See R.A. Crouch & C. Elliott. Moral Agency and the Family: The
Case of Living Related Organ Transplantation. Camb Q Healthc Ethics
1999; 8: 275–87: 283.
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it has to be acknowledged that some of the psychological
risks of donation may be increased for mentally incom-
petent donors. Thus, for instance, they might be under
great stress due to their failure to understand the meaning
of the medical intervention, or to adapt to the unfamiliar
environment of a hospital and the strains of the whole
procedure.36
Taking into account that kidney removal entails more
than minimal health risks, that mentally incompetents
are unlikely to experience the psychological benefits that
have been attributed to competent donors, and that
they also face increased psychological risks, it is obvious
that the removal of a kidney from mentally incompe-
tents will only very rarely be justifiable. Indeed, this
kind of intervention may only be warranted if the con-
tinued survival of the intended recipient is essential to
the overall well-being of the mentally incompetent
person. Because it cannot be ruled out that surrogate
decision-makers may be guided by their own opinions
and judgments and may exaggerate even speculative
psychological factors, we strongly advocate the adop-
tion of a clear and convincing evidentiary burden of
proof. First, the proposed kidney donor has to demon-
strate a threshold level of cognitive and emotional
capacities. Due to their immaturity or mental affliction,
only few mentally incompetents will have developed
‘other-regarding’ interests that are strong enough to
cause severe adverse reactions to the death of other
people.37 Second and most importantly, as will be dis-
cussed in more detail below, it has to be ascertained that
the mentally incompetent person strongly identifies
with the intended recipient. Only the prospect that the
mentally incompetent person would be spared severe
psychological distress and would receive continued
personal companionship may represent a psychological
benefit that is significant enough to outweigh the risks
that may arise from kidney removal. This position was
clearly articulated in Strunk v. Strunk, where the court
established that the survival of the intended recipient –
who was the mentally incompetent’s only sibling, his
role model, and his tie to his family, and who would be
the only source of intimate communication and primary
care after their parents’ eventual death – was essential
to the mentally incompetent’s psychological stability.
The court reasoned that the transplantation would be
beneficial to the mentally incompetent donor, because
‘Jerry was greatly dependent upon Tommy, emotionally
as well as psychologically, and that his well-being would
be jeopardized more severely by the loss of his brother
than by the removal of a kidney.’38
The relationship of the mentally incompetent
person with the intended recipient
Thus, inextricably bound to the requirement of psycho-
logical benefit is the condition that mentally incompetent
persons may only donate to a recipient that they have
an ongoing personal relationship with. However, if we
accept that the degree of emotional intimacy is the decid-
ing factor, a restriction to close relatives might sometimes
be problematic. For one, volunteering a mentally incom-
petent individual to serve as a donor to a relative who is
unknown, estranged or even abusive would be totally
unacceptable. As Curran v. Bosze famously illustrated,
close attachment does not always exist between biological
family members.39 On a related note, the assertion that
family members possess obligations to promote the
health of others, because their interests are shared,40
must be rejected when applied to mentally incompetents.
Indeed, the claim that mentally incompetents are the
bearers of intra-familial obligations that may commit
them to sacrifice their personal interest for the good of
another family member, amounts to a license for ‘com-
pelled altruism’. Organ removal from a mentally incom-
petent individual needs a greater justification than the
mere existence of a family tie.41 In each case of intra-
familial donation by mentally incompetents, it must be
ensured that the degree of intimacy is strong enough to
justify an invasion of their bodily integrity. On the other
hand, intimate attachments can also exist between men-
tally incompetents and people with whom they are not
biologically related. Because the well-being of the men-
tally incompetent person may be severely compromised if
a close friend or more distant relative would die, the
range of possible recipients may, in very exceptional
circumstances and only if all other requirements are
fulfilled, be extended to include people who are not bio-
logically related to the mentally incompetent.42
36 See L.E. Lebit. Compelled Medical Procedures Involving Minors
and Incompetents and Misapplication of the Substituted Judgment
Doctrine. J Law Health 1992; 7: 107–130: 119.
37 See P. Lewis. Procedures that Are Against the Medical Interests of
Incompetent Adults. Oxford J Legal Stud 2002; 22: 575–618: 589.
38 Strunk v. Strunk (1969) 445 S.W. 2d 145 (Ky Ct of App) at 146.
39 In Curran v. Bosze, bone marrow transplant compatibility testing on
two 3-year-old twins was denied because the court held that they had no
existing, close relationship with the intended recipient, who was their
half-brother, since they were living in a separate household and had
only met him twice. See Curran v. Bosze (1990) 566 N.E. 2d 1319 (Ill) at
1343–1344.
40 E.g. J. Dwyer & E. Vig. Rethinking Transplantation between
Siblings. Hastings Cent Rep 1995; 25: 7–19; L.A. Jansen. Child Organ
Donation, Family Autonomy, and Intimate Attachments. Camb Q
Healthc Ethics 2004; 13: 133–142: 136; H. Klepper. Incompetent Organ
Donors. J Soc Philos 1994; 25: 241–255: 253.
41 See D. Steinberg. Kidney Transplants from Young Children and the
Mental Retarded. Theor Med 2004; 25: 229–234: 233.
42 Cf. Jansen, op. cit. note 40: 139.
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Who should decide?
As important as specifying which substantive require-
ments have to be satisfied is the procedural issue of
determining who should have the power to make the
assessment and decide whether organ removal may occur.
The mentally incompetent person herself is in no position
to make that kind of decision, because she arguably
lacks the ability to adequately appraise the situation
and fully comprehend the nature and consequences of
her choice. The extent to which mentally incompetents
should be involved in the authorization procedure is open
to debate. If possible, prospective mentally incompetent
donors should be informed about the significance and
circumstances of the intervention, in a manner consistent
with their level of maturity and cognitive ability. Subse-
quently, they should be consulted about their willingness
to donate. If they should actively dissent to the proposed
donation, the organ removal should not be carried out.
Such refusal should be morally binding because little or
no psychological benefits are to be expected if the men-
tally incompetent person opposes the donation. On the
other hand, depending on her level of cognitive and
moral development, a strong desire to donate may be an
increasingly crucial factor in favouring organ removal.43
Apart from the needs to consult the prospective donor
and to verify that she does not refuse, organ removal
should only be allowed if the legal guardians (often the
parents) give free and informed consent. In order for their
permission to be valid, the guardians must have been
informed about all relevant facts, including the purpose,
nature, consequences, and risks involved. In balancing
the risks and benefits, the guardians should decide what
they deem to be in the best interest of their ward. Because
guardians are normally motivated by natural bonds of
affection and feelings of responsibility, they are supposed
to be in the best position to consider and protect the
interests of the potential donors. For this reason, some
commentators argue that the decision regarding organ
harvest from mentally incompetents should be left to the
discretion of the guardians.44 However, allowing guard-
ians to grant permission for organ removal may pose
severe problems if the prospective recipient is another of
their children or a close relative who is in desperate need
of the organ. If they are surrogate decision-makers for
both the healthy incompetent child and a recipient child,
guardians may consciously or subconsciously be tempted
to save a competent child at the expense of the incompe-
tent one. The possibility of a conflict of interests would
leave the incompetent individual unprotected from
family pressures and even from outright coercion. To
prevent this from happening, custodial permission should
only be a necessary but not a sufficient requirement,
unlike in Belgium, where a guardian from a legal point of
view may even coerce her ward to serve as her own organ
source.
Since the request to use a mentally incompetent person
as an organ source is often characterized by the despair of
parents who are confronted with a competent child in
urgent need of a transplant, approval by an independent
body should be required. It could be argued that the
decision should be left to the medical team, because it has
the best understanding of the medical aspects and the
expected risks and benefits to the donor. However, since
the surgeons may be involved in the care of the recipient
and hence may be strictly focussed on the prospect of
saving her life, the interests of the donor may all too
easily be neglected.45 In order to guarantee a more inde-
pendent assessment, some countries have delegated
decision-making to the court, to an ad hoc body at the
national level or to a hospital ethics committee. Courts of
law have the major advantage that they are impartial and
can invoke a whole range of safeguards, such as appoint-
ing a guardian ad litem, whomay ensure that the mentally
incompetent’s interests are best served. However, con-
tested court proceedings are both costly and time con-
suming, with a distinctive risk that the prospective
recipient may die while waiting. Moreover, judges may
have firm convictions about justice that do not always
correspond to the perceptions of the intended donor.
Hospital ethics committees can reach a decision at a
lower cost and much more swiftly, but they lack the
necessary independence and are already overburdened.
Thus, what seems to be required is a pluridisciplinary
committee (unrelated to any particular hospital and com-
prising physicians, ethicists, social workers, and lawyers)
which would analyse, assess, and decide the thorny issues
that need to be addressed in these cases. Such a commit-
tee should be enabled to investigate the facts of the case
thoroughly, while at the same time attempting to reach a
swift decision.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Confronted with the numerous and highly complicated
issues involved, it might seem that imposing a statutory
total ban on organ harvest from mentally incompetents is
the most advisable option. We do not, however, advocate
such a solution, as in specific (although rare) cases it may
imply a lack of respect for the interests of the individuals
concerned.
43 N. Biller-Andorno et al. Who Shall Be Allowed to Give? Living
Organ Donors and the Concept of Autonomy. Theor Med Bioeth 2001;
22: 351–368.
44 See, for instance, M.T. Morley. Proxy Consent to Organ Donation
by Incompetents. Yale Law J 2002; 111: 1215–1249: 1248.
45 S.L. Nygren. Organ Donation by Incompetent Patients: A Hybrid
Approach. Univ Chic Leg Forum 2006; 471–502: 500.
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Whereas the use of mentally incompetents as bone
marrow donors seems morally permissible in view of the
minimal risks involved, in our view, their use as partial
liver donors ought to be uniformly rejected, given the
unacceptably high level of medical risk for the donor, as
mentioned earlier, which cannot possibly be outweighed
by any psychological benefits. The risks associated with
kidney removal are, we feel, too significant to be rou-
tinely minimized but not high enough to warrant a cat-
egorical rejection of kidney harvesting from mentally
incompetents.
Thus, we have tried to argue for some guidelines that
should, in our view, always be followed when envisaging
the removal of a kidney from an incompetent individual.
In sum, (1) the medical condition of the recipient renders
the transplant absolutely necessary; (2) the prospective
donor is a source of last resort, meaning that no medical
alternative exists, that no cadaveric organ is available,
and that no competent compatible person could donate;
(3) it is very likely that the transplant will be successful,
and the organ will not be rejected; (4) the foreseeable
risks and medical complications for the donor have
been found to be acceptable; (5) highly significant
non-speculative psychological benefits for the donor are
to be expected; (6) the donor and recipient are in a close
relationship, whether biologically linked or not; (7) the
mentally incompetent prospective donor has been
involved to the greatest possible extent in the decision-
making process and has not actively dissented; (8) the
legal guardians have given free and informed consent;
(9) the final decision is taken by a pluridisciplinary inde-
pendent body.
In our view, only respecting these guidelines will ensure
that a fair and adequate balance between the duties to
protect vulnerable persons from harmful bodily invasions
and to help sick people in desperate medical need may be
reached.
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